Thursday, December 18, 2014

Hotels Make Los Angeles Way More Money Than New Housing, Even After Big Subsidies

I've got a new post up at the Urban One blog, this one addressing the controversial subsidies intended to attract more hotel development to the area around Downtown LA's convention center. Click here to see the full post.

A lot of the arguments in favor of the subsidies have focused on the need for more hotel rooms in a downtown that is relatively hotel-poor — it has fewer than half as many rooms within walking distance of its convention center as competitive cities like San Diego, San Francisco, and Las Vegas.

My interest, in comparison, was with the direct financial benefits, focusing on an often-overlooked (and huge) source of revenue known as the "transient occupancy tax," colloquially known as the hotel tax or bed tax. What I found is that, in lieu of public assistance, a hotel development that recently began construction is expected to produce more than five times as much city revenue over a 25-year period as a comparable condo project. Even after the subsidies used to encourage the developer to build a hotel instead of more residential, the city comes out ahead by about $70 million compared to the condo building.

See below for a few charts from the post, and be sure to follow the link to Urban One's blog to get the full story.

Tuesday, December 2, 2014

California High Speed Rail Could Earn the State Over $40 Billion in Profit

Earlier this year I argued that the up-front cost of local transportation projects, like light rail and bus rapid transit, aren't really comparable to the cost of California's high speed rail system. While all of these investments are fighting for the same dollars to some degree, their long-term balance sheets look very different: Local transit typically requires a persistent operating subsidy, whereas even the low-ridership estimates for high speed rail forecast a consistent operating profit. As a result, longer time horizons favor high speed rail, as profits gradually eat away at the high initial capital costs required to build out the network.

Unfortunately, the existing literature on California's high speed rail project doesn't take the long view. The official source for HSR's cost, revenue, and ridership projections – the California High Speed Rail Authority's 2014 Business Plan – limits its analysis to a 35-year operational period, from approximately 2025 to 2060. Much of the rail infrastructure, however, including some of the most expensive aspects of the project such as tunnels, viaducts, and bridges, have 100-year lifespans. Other up-front costs, such as for right-of-way acquisition, will only require a single, one-time payment.

Given this reality, what we need is an analysis that accounts for a more complete utilization of assets – an analysis that can fully amortize the high up-front capital costs over their useful lifetimes and most accurately determine the extent to which California HSR revenues can cover not just operational costs, but also those of capital. The analysis below will look at costs and revenue over a full 100-year period, at which point even the longest-lasting rail infrastructure will require full replacement. The spreadsheet analysis on which this is based can be found here. (Note that this analysis is ultimately just a simple extrapolation, unmindful of whatever technical constraints official analysts are required to work within.)

It's not my intent that the project live or die by its economics, any more than a bikeway or subway line (or a highway) should be discarded just because it doesn't earn money. High speed rail has countless side benefits, including improved connections between California’s major cities, reduced emissions in the heavily-polluted Central Valley and reduced air and road congestion throughout the state, job creation, more sustainable growth near stations, preservation of valuable agricultural land, and reduced car dependence. All of these benefits have been reported at length by writers like James Fallows and Robert Cruickshank, and they're all important to the final “go/no-go” determination. The purpose here is to expand our perspective beyond the social, environmental, and mobility impacts of this project, to include the potential for long-term, direct fiscal benefits as well.

So, let's get started.


The California high speed rail project's current capital cost estimate is $54.9 billion (all values reported here will be in 2013 dollars), contingent upon a variety of factors that haven't yet been finalized, including whether the system will travel underground through the Angeles National Forest, or take a cheaper (but more circuitous) route between Palmdale and Los Angeles.

It's fair to question whether the state and its contractors will be able to hold to this estimate. In an analysis of 258 mega-projects around the world, researcher Bent Flyvbjerg found that 9 out of 10 came in over budget, with an average cost overrun of 28 percent. But, as the chairman of the CA HSR Authority has himself noted, their team has put the project through an extremely rigorous risk assessment/management program, and it's unlikely that any project in the country has undergone more outside scrutiny. In lieu of credible alternative estimates, we'll have to take the word of the Authority and the independent panel of experts that oversee their work.


The estimated annual revenues from the 2014 Business Plan, for select years through 2060, are shown below:

These numbers represent only farebox revenue, i.e., revenue from ticket sales; ancillary revenue sources such as advertising, concessions, and real estate interests are not included. After 2035, ridership, and therefore revenue, is expected to have reached 100% of its current potential – growth that follows is presumably the result of other factors, such as increased demand for travel and population growth. For this analysis we will use the Medium Ridership scenario, which corresponds to roughly the 50th percentile of potential ridership outcomes. The forecast assumes 5.1 percent growth over each five-year period through 2060 (about one percent per year).* Extrapolating this to the year 2125, farebox revenue is anticipated to total $3.849 billion ($3,849 million) in 2125.

Under this ridership scenario, cumulative revenue for years 2025 through 2125 is $240.7 billion. Ancillary revenue sources in other high speed rail markets have added 2 to 30 percent over and above farebox revenues, and it is conservatively estimated here that CAHSR will produce ancillary incomes of 5 percent above farebox. This brings cumulative revenues to $252.8 billion by the year 2125.


Operating costs represent the cost of running the high speed rail system, including labor, electricity, and general maintenance required to maintain a state of good repair for vehicles, tracks and track structures, stations, etc. It does not include the cost of major rehabilitation or replacement of capital resources, due either to significant unaccounted-for breakdowns or resources reaching the ends of their useful lives. These costs are accounted for in the “Lifecycle Costs” section of this analysis, found further below.

The estimated annual operations and maintenance costs from the 2014 Business Plan, for select years through 2060, are shown below:

As with revenues, we'll assume the Medium Cost scenario for this analysis. The forecast assumes 2.0 percent operations and maintenance cost growth over each five-year period (0.4 percent per year) through 2060.* Extrapolating this to the year 2125, O&M costs are anticipated to total $1.225 billion ($1,225 million) in 2125.

Under this scenario, cumulative operations and maintenance costs for years 2025 through 2125 are $100.2 billion by the year 2125.


Lifecycle costs are those costs not covered under operations and maintenance, that include major rehabilitation and replacement of system infrastructure such as tracks, stations, tunnels, etc. Using the Business Plan's “50-Year Lifecycle Capital Cost Model Documentation,” which describes the expected lifetime of all capital assets, anticipated rehabilitation schedules and costs, and replacement costs, I was able to extend this analysis to the year 2125. Where capital asset rehab and replacement costs are listed as a percentage of initial capital costs, values were taken from Exhibit 3.4 in the Business Plan.

Total lifecycle costs over this time period come to approximately $56.3 billion. This is almost certainly a conservative estimate, as the lifecycle costs through 2060 total $8.6 billion, a 22 percent premium over Business Plan estimates. (The Business Plan estimates a cumulative lifecycle cost of $7.0 billion by 2060.)

Because the 50-Year Lifecycle documentation provides limited line-item detail, and some longer-lived infrastructure lacked detailed rehabilitation and replacement cost estimates, various simplifying assumptions were made that tended to overestimate likely costs.**


Below is a summary of these results, including additional sensitivity analysis to account for potentially slower increases in revenue growth, faster increases in costs, or both. Under the baseline circumstances described above, the state of California could realize a long-term profit of approximately $41 billion:

The low revenue scenario assumes slower revenue growth after 2060, with increases of just 2 percent, rather than 5.1 percent, every five years. The high cost scenario assumes faster O&M cost growth, with increases of 5 percent, rather than 2 percent, every five years. The Low Revenue, High Cost scenario combines these two scenarios. As you can see, only under the latter scenario does the state lose money, and even then it amounts to a loss of just $109 million per year – still enough to pay off the vast majority of capital costs. Compare this to what we would spend expanding our airports and roadway network in response to the state's population growth and increased demand for intra-state travel, and even a slight loss on high speed rail looks pretty appealing.

This is, of course, far from the last word on the California high speed rail project's economics. Numerous other scenarios are possible, including higher up-front capital costs, systemically lower ridership, or higher operations costs. This also doesn't take into account the likelihood of private partnerships and financing costs, which will almost certainly divert some profits away from the state. That said, there’s no reason to believe things couldn't actually turn out better for the state – these are just median projections, after all. We've certainly been surprised by above-average ridership on local transit throughout the country, from Seattle to Tucson to LA itself. Looking this far into the future, it's impossible to know exactly how things will shake out.

In the end, the point is that we're not building a high speed rail network for 35 years of use. It's a much longer-term investment in California's future that could be in operation for a century or more. The project's benefits are to be enjoyed by residents and visitors to California throughout that period – not just fiscal benefits, but environmental, mobility, health, and social – so we should take care to examine its costs over the same timeline.

*Note that, because all values are reported in 2013 dollars, inflation will result in higher cost and revenue growth in nominal terms.

**Some simplifying assumptions for the lifecycle cost estimate:

  • The project is completed in phases from 2022 to 2028, but this analysis averages these phases out, assuming the capital lifecycle clock starts ticking in 2025.
  • Capital equipment in “Category 30 – Support Facilities, Yards, Shops, Administration Buildings” did not provide rehabilitation costs as a share of total up-front capital costs for that category (example: total capital costs for the category were $779 million; rehabbing the overhead catenary might cost 2% of that total), rehabilitation schedules varied between 20 and 30 years, and lifespans tended to meet or exceed 50 years. To simplify, it was assumed that all components in this category would be rehabilitated after 20 years at 100% of initial capital costs, rehabbed again 20 years later at 50% of initial capital costs, and replaced 10 years later at 100% of initial capital costs. 
  • Similar assumptions were made for categories 50 and 60.
  • It was assumed that the number of train sets would increase by 50 percent in 2085 and double by 2115.
  • Pedestrian, bicycle, car, and bus access (including roads) rehab and replacement data was not provided in the 50-Year Lifecycle documentation, so it was very conservatively estimated that this would cost $500 million. With rehabilitation every 10 years and replacement every 50 years, this alone added $3 billion to the 100-year lifecycle costs for the project.

Saturday, November 22, 2014

VIDEO: How to Maximize Parking Productivity in the City

Providing enough space for everyone who wants to park their cars in the city is expensive -- upwards of $50,000 per space for some underground garages. It drives up the cost of housing and commercial space, forces non-drivers to subsidize car owners, and results in ugly architecture that dedicates lots of space to parking that will probably go to waste in the coming decades.

To fix this, we could limit the amount of parking we build, encourage car- and ride-sharing technologies like Zipcar and Uber, and increase the convenience and safety of transit, walking, and bicycling.

Or we could all just learn to park like this guy, and cut our parking requirements in half by tomorrow:

Tuesday, November 11, 2014

A Few New Posts On Los Angeles Housing Supply

Tokyo has kept housing prices under control by building much faster than population growth; LA is more in line with slow-growth, high-cost cities like London and New York.
I've written a few posts at my employer's blog in the past few weeks, focusing on the 2014 Casden Multifamily report for the Southern California region, and Mayor Garcetti's proposal to build 100,000 new homes by 2021. Click the links below to read the full stories:

Los Angeles Housing Supply Must Grow, Quickly, to Keep Prices Under Control

Despite a recent "boom" in housing construction, the Los Angeles housing supply must grow much faster in order to stay affordable to future residents.

Read more here.


How Los Angeles Can Build 100,000 New Homes by 2021

LA must take a multi-pronged approach to tackling the affordable housing crisis, increasing funding while easing the path for more private development.

Thursday, November 6, 2014

Beyond Green Belts: Connecting Rather Than Containing Our Cities

In city planning there's a popular phrase: "Stop sprawl, preserve existing neighborhoods, maintain affordability. Pick two." It's a poignant observation of the relationship between these three goals and the tension between them — how in a place like Houston, homes remain affordable and neighborhoods maintain their character as long as sprawl can continue unabated; or how London can enforce an urban growth boundary to prevent sprawl, but without significant new construction in older neighborhoods its housing prices have reached astronomical heights.

The London green belt, one of the world's most famous.
Image from
For the uninitiated, green belts — sometimes known as urban growth boundaries — are undeveloped regions that surround many cities and limit sprawl while preserving green space. And as the Guardian notes, "[a]lmost anyone you talk to on the subject agrees that the green belt is one of the great successes of planning, anywhere in the world." They encourage more efficient use of developed land, keep nature close to home for city residents, and prevent the interminable sprawl of low-density development that characterizes many U.S. metro areas, especially in the Southwest.

But green belts have a dark side. London, home to perhaps the best-known green belt in the world, also has the dubious distinction of being the most expensive rental market in the world, recently overtaking Hong Kong as the city with the highest residential and commercial rents. As with any other artificial limits on the supply of new housing in an ever-growing city, green belts are at least partially to blame for London's affordability crisis. Some have also claimed that Portland's rapid increase in housing prices is partly a result of their urban growth boundary. The question is, then, how can we maintain access to green space and limit sprawl, while still allowing cities to grow naturally, in sync with demand?

One potential answer is to discard the idea of green "belts" and to replace them with "webs" — green space spread throughout the city that connects rather than contains it.

The problem with green belts, aside from the supply restrictions they impose on new housing, is that they're not particularly accessible to a large number of residents. Using London as an example once more, it's clear that residents of Central London are too distant from the green belt to consider it valuable as an open space resource, and ideally they would have other parkland at a more accessible distance. Green belts are undoubtedly wonderful resources for those that live within a mile or two of them — those that can afford to, that is — but inner city residents don't typically get to enjoy them, and for those that live beyond the green belt they simply add more time to each day's commute. It may be prettier than the average commute, but there's very little "green" about it. It would be much better to have them living nearer their work, in denser, more energy-efficient housing.

For a great example of what a green web could look like, Amigos de los Rios have a proposal for us in, of all places, Los Angeles County. The project is called the Emerald Necklace Vision Plan, named in honor of Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr., who designed New York's Central Park and Boston's Emerald Necklace park system, and his son Frederick Jr., who helped create a vision for LA parks in 1930 that was, unfortunately, never realized. The Emerald Necklace Vision Plan is pictured in part below:

In the Emerald Necklace Vision Plan, green space connects residents throughout Los Angeles. Image from Amigos de los Rios.
Taking advantage of several existing LA initiatives, including the Army Corps of Engineers' billion-dollar LA River revitalization program, the Greenway 2020 Plan, and plans for a 38-acre park on top of the 101 freeway, the project would create a network of green space throughout the region and put parks within easy reach of millions of LA County residents. Just as importantly, it would provide safe, convenient routes for walking and bicycling throughout the city, and create value to promote the development of more homes and businesses near the trails, rather than in the suburban/exurban Orange, San Bernardino, and Riverside Counties.

LA is surrounded by water, mountains, and other cities, so it lacks a green belt, but the appeal of a "green web" is that it could have value in nearly any context. For Los Angeles, the number of properties that would need to be destroyed could be replaced 20 times over with new (re)development near green space — including affordable housing, which could be funded by (e.g.) a partial tax-increment on park-adjacent land. We'd have thousands of new, energy-efficient units near world-class active transportation corridors, and if there's one thing LA needs right now, it's more housing.

Rough example of a London green web, in which much of
the outside green space could be opened up for development.
Cities like London and Portland have it easier, because they can build out their network by expanding development beyond their growth boundaries and leaving stretches of undeveloped space to create "strands" within the green web. The growth of the web into the existing urban fabric could then be funded by proceeds from selling off land and development rights in the green belt. The large majority of the green belt could be maintained while bringing much more accessible green space to residents nearer the core of their cities.

In cities with or without green belts, there are opportunities to use green webs to create value throughout a region, and unlike isolated park and infrastructure projects, they can cast a wide enough net to limit the impact of gentrification in individual neighborhoods. They can add desperately-needed housing in some of the least affordable regions, increasing density in some locations and spurring new investment in historically disinvested neighborhoods. They can provide residents with a wealth of green space that doubles as a transportation resource, and is, most importantly, actually accessible. Best of all, they can build off of existing plans, the Hollywood cap park being an excellent example.

[Feel free to comment if you can spot any weaknesses or opportunities for improvement, because this is very much an idea in progress. For example, how would this be funded in lieu of a tax-increment type funding source? Since full expansion would require condemnation of many homes and businesses, how do you go through that process in a fair, equitable manner (or is contrary to the whole idea of eminent domain)? If this sounds totally politically or physically impossible, can you suggest what might make it more plausible? Any ideas for names that are better than "green web"? Thanks!]

Related link:

Tuesday, November 4, 2014

How to Be Prepared For the Inevitable Takeover of Autonomous Vehicles: A Letter to Jeff Brandes

"I sure hope no one else gets in here." Photo from Car and Driver.

In Florida, Republican state senator Jeff Brandes is making the case that Pinellas County – home of the last metro area in the U.S. to develop a regional transit network – shouldn't invest in light rail because autonomous vehicles will make mass transit pointless. Self-driving cars will eliminate congestion, increase safety, and cut down on travel times, and we need to be prepared for that eventuality and ensure that we don't waste any money in the mean time.

In that spirit, I've put together a list of recommendations that Mr. Brandes can use in developing policy to prepare for this brave new world of robotic transportation. It's one thing not to waste money on a boondoggle technology like light rail that's faithfully served people for barely even 100 years –if we're serious about autonomous vehicles and their guaranteed ability to solve all of our problems, we need to be more proactive:

  • First, driverless cars can drive much closer together than human-operated vehicles. This will significantly increase roadway capacity and throughput, so we should start eliminating roads and replacing them with bike lanes, sidewalks, parks, and housing. Since self-driving cars are so efficient, we can repurpose all that road space for more productive uses. At the very least we should impose an immediate moratorium on all new road construction, because fiscal conservatism.
  • Second, driverless cars don't need to be stored near our destinations because they can just operate as inexpensive taxis all day long, so we should immediately eliminate all parking minimums, requirements for garage construction, and probably disallow curb cuts as well. All that parking we build today is going to be wasted in just a few short years! (What isn't already being wasted, that is.)
  • With driverless cars available at our beck and call there will no longer be a need to own your own car, so we should prepare our citizens for this new transportation regime by aggressively promoting car-share services like Zipcar and Car2Go. To make sure they catch on, we may want to ban the use of curbside parking for everyone except car-share users, and give them priority on our highway carpool/toll lanes.
  • If someone buys a car a decade from now it might have to be junked five years later, once driverless cars take over and become mandatory. We don't want people to waste their money on such a poor investment, so we should probably just ban cars entirely until scientists get the autonomous vehicle technology locked down. Everyone will have saved so much money that they'll be able to buy new cars as fast as the factories can churn them out.

As you can see, there's so much more to do than prevent people from having an inexpensive, sustainable, efficient mode of travel for the next 15-20 years. As Senator Brandes will no doubt agree, these are policies that complement a pro-driverless vehicle agenda perfectly, and will even serve people well if his predictions don't come to fruition, which they most certainly will.

Listen Jeff: I know that some Republicans have a reputation for being shills for the highway industry, but I can tell that you take the future of transportation seriously and that you won't let anyone stand in the way of progress and good financial stewardship. I look forward to your upcoming bills, Senator.

Friday, October 17, 2014

"Vehicle Drives Into Apartment Building"

Is avoiding the fact that human beings actually operate vehicles a part of the LA Times style manual now?

Here's one from today:
At least two people hurt when car strikes Winnetka apartment 
At least two people were injured Thursday night in Winnetka after a car plowed into an apartment building, authorities said. 
The car struck the building, in the 20000 block of Saticoy Street, about 9:15 p.m., said Erik Scott, a spokesman with the Los Angeles Fire Department. 
The extent of the two people's injuries was not immediately known, nor whether they were in the car or the building. 
The L.A. Department of Building and Safety was at the scene to assess the structural integrity of the building, Scott said.
Cars, man. They're on a rampage! At least we know, per the third paragraph, that there may have been at least one person in the car.